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 ABSTRACT :  I explore the role of hypernorms in the Integrative Social Contracts 
Theory (ISCT) of Thomas Donaldson and Thomas W. Dunfee, who suggested that 
hypernorms are a necessary condition for the rejection of cultural relativism and 
justifi cation of moral norms within and across social communities. Hypernorms are, 
thus, a signifi cant part of a conception of international business ethics. I highlight 
philosophical problems that emerge in attempts to identify and justify hypernorms. 
These problems have not been suffi ciently addressed in the ISCT; therefore, I will 
discuss the discourse–ethical contributions of contemporary German philosophers 
toward resolving the justifi cation problem with regards to universal norms. 
Discourse ethics builds on the linguistic and the pragmatic turns in philosophy 
and develops procedural rules for the assessment of norms. I explore variants of 
discourse ethics with regards to their concept of justifi cation and discuss the impli-
cations of discourse ethical procedures for the justifi cation of norms and actions. 
 KEY WORDS:  constructivism ,  discourse ethics ,  hypernorms ,  Integrative Social 
Contracts Theory ,  linguistic turn ,  pragmatic turn 
 As soon as we refl ect on a loss of naïve certainties, we no longer face a set of 
basic propositions that are “self-legitimating.” That is there are no indubitable “starting 
points” beyond the bounds of language, no experiences that can be taken for granted 
within the bounds of reasons. (Habermas  2003a , 36) 
 I. 
 TWENTY YEARS AGO Thomas Donaldson and Thomas W. Dunfee (1994) published “Toward a Unifi ed Conception of Business Ethics: Integrative 
Social Contracts Theory.” Five years later their Integrative Social Contracts Theory 
(ISCT) was further developed in their seminal book,  Ties That Bind (Donaldson 
and Dunfee  1999a ). The authors diagnosed incoherence and lack of direction not 
only in the academic discourse on business ethics, but also in management practice 
where global business fi rms operate in different environments, with heterogeneous 
social rules and moral expectations but without suffi cient theoretical guidance. As 
a consequence, it is unclear what rules can be applied to the moral assessment of 
the behavior of global business fi rms. 
 In moral and social philosophy, social contract theory has a long tradition that 
essentially extends from thinkers of the Enlightenment, such as Thomas Hobbes, 
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John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, to more recent philosophers, such as John 
Rawls ( 1971 ) and David Gauthier ( 1986 ). Social contract theory explores the origins 
of society and suggests that individuals have implicitly or explicitly consented to 
submit themselves to the authority of societal institutions (e.g., state, laws, rules, 
morals) in exchange for the protection of their freedoms and rights as members of the 
society. In their Integrative Social Contracts Theory, Donaldson and Dunfee ( 1994 , 
 1999a ) build on this tradition and suggest that social norms and moral obligations 
can be explained and justifi ed by contractual relationships among members of social 
communities. These contractual relationships are both hypothetical and factual, and 
exist on two societal levels: macrosocial and microsocial. 
 The “macrosocial” contract is conceived as a hypothetical contract to which all 
members of society implicitly consent. The macrosocial contract provides “objective 
background standards for social interaction” (Donaldson and Dunfee  1999a , 19) and 
“defi nes the normative ground rules” for “microsocial” contracts (Donaldson and 
Dunfee  1994 , 254). The normativity of the macrosocial contract rests on the assumption 
that all rational humans consent, at least hypothetically, to the terms of the contract. 
 Microsocial contracts, by contrast, are nonhypothetical. They are often only infor-
mal (so-called “authentic”) contracts between members of specifi c communities, 
such as corporations, industries, professional associations, trade associations, or 
national systems. Microsocial contracts defi ne social rules and moral obligations 
that take account of particular circumstances and help cope with the complexity and 
varieties of conditions in the business world. They help toward making decisions 
that are morally acceptable within particular social communities. 
 The proposed “unifi ed theory” of Donaldson and Dunfee aims at an  integration 
of ethical perspectives in two respects. In the fi rst, Donaldson and Dunfee want to 
bridge the  gap between empirical and normative theory , that is, between theory that 
explains observable social phenomena and theory that prescribes certain behavior. 
The aim is to develop a theory that takes into account the various factors that 
infl uence individual behavior but that goes beyond mere explanation. Therefore, 
the authors want to propose a theory that helps decide the ethical acceptability of 
a certain behavior and provides guidance on what actors  should do. By engaging 
with this endeavor, they “seek to put the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ in symbiotic harmony” 
(Donaldson and Dunfee  1999a , 24). 
 In the second, Donaldson and Dunfee also want to bridge the  gap between gen-
eral ethical theories and local moral rules . The former operate on a high level 
of abstraction, while the latter are tailored to specifi c situations and take the values 
of particular social communities or cultures into account. The aim is to develop a 
higher-level ethical theory that embraces the heterogeneous social rules and moral 
norms of different cultural or national communities and helps assess the normative 
validity of these local rules across social communities. 
 II. 
 Donaldson and Dunfee reject cultural relativism and maintain that the authenticity 
of microlevel contracts does not guarantee their ethical acceptability and legitimacy 
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across various cultural or national communities. They hold that “by insisting that 
any extant contracts cohere with the moral limits established by a broad macro or 
hypothetical contract, relativism is avoided” (Donaldson & Dunfee  1999a , p. 20). The 
authors propose that there is evidence for the existence of so-called “hypernorms.” 
Hypernorms are part of the macrosocial contract and limit the “moral free space” 
within which microsocial contracts can emerge and be considered justifi ed. 
 Donaldson and Dunfee ( 1999b , p. 46) explain, “Hypernorms are principles so fun-
damental that, by defi nition, they serve to evaluate lower order norms, reaching to 
the root of what is ethical for humanity. They represent norms by which all others 
are to be judged.” Donaldson and Dunfee ( 1999a , p. 50) emphasize the signifi cance of 
hypernorms for ISCT and speak of them as “second-order moral concepts,” and 
as “far-reaching norms […] credited with independent status” and “considered 
as presumptive and axiomatic of the theory.” 
 Thus the existence of hypernorms is considered a  necessary condition for lower-level 
moral norms to develop within acceptable moral boundaries. Without such hyper-
norms, the Integrative Social Contract Theory will lead to cultural relativism.  Cultural 
relativism , by defi nition, maintains that it is neither possible nor acceptable to judge 
the ethical validity of social norms or actions  across different moral communities.  1  
 The relativist view is grounded in the assumption that a person or culture  believing an act 
is morally correct, helps  make it morally correct—or at least to make it correct for  that per-
son or  that culture. In its pure form, relativism would allow any individual or community 
to defi ne ethically correct behavior in any way they wished. No matter how bizarre, their 
ethics would be on a par with everyone else’s. (Donaldson & Dunfee  1999a , p. 20) 
 Donaldson and Dunfee respond to the challenge of how to discover and to jus-
tify hypernorms with reference to the “existence of the convergence of religious, 
cultural, and philosophical beliefs around certain core principles” that may “serve 
as a clue, even if not as total validation, for the identifi cation of hypernorms” 
(Donaldson and Dunfee  1994 , 265). Later, they more cautiously formulate, “at least 
it is a reasonable hope that we should discern such a convergence” (Donaldson and 
Dunfee  1999a , 44). 
 The authors distinguish between three different categories of hypernorms (51–53): 
procedural, structural, and substantive.  Procedural hypernorms specify the “rights 
of exit and voice essential to support microsocial consent” (51). Here they touch 
upon rules of argumentation as proposed by philosophers such as Jürgen Habermas 
( 1990 ) and Robert Alexy ( 1989 ), but they do not explore this avenue further. Although 
Donaldson and Dunfee (1999a, 54–56) touch upon the role of language in normative 
or empirical inquiry, they treat language as a neutral tool for the transmission of 
meaning. However, they neglect an insight, gained from the linguistic turn in philos-
ophy, which is that language has a constitutive role in the construction of normative 
or empirical knowledge (Habermas  2003a ,  2003b ). 
 Structural hypernorms entail principles that are essential for political and soci-
etal institutions to function properly, including the right to property, the right to 
fair treatment under the law, and the right to political participation. They discuss 
an “effi ciency hypernorm” in detail (Donaldson and Dunfee  1999a , 117–38) and 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/beq.2015.36
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Karger Libri ISA Ltd, on 28 Aug 2018 at 16:55:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Business Ethics Quarterly492
consider this structural norm an indispensible condition of economic activity, as it 
is essential for providing the necessary social goods in society. Their fi nal typology 
consists of  substantive hypernorms , “which specify fundamental conceptions of the 
right and the good” (52). 
 Donaldson and Dunfee suggest that procedural and structural hypernorms are 
more implicit in the hypothetical macrosocial contract and can thus be identifi ed 
only with diffi culty, whereas “substantive hypernorms are to be found on the outside. 
They are in effect,  exogenous ” (52). Purely procedural conceptions of morality are 
regarded as being “too thin” (56) because they do not defi ne and prescribe particular 
moral values; the authors, therefore, suggest that procedural and structural hyper-
norms need to be supplemented by substantive norms. They build on the concept 
of moral minimalism proposed by Michael Walzer (1994, 18), which “consists in 
principles and rules that are reiterated in different times and places and that are seen 
to be similar even though they are expressed in different idioms and refl ect different 
histories and different versions of the world.” 
 Despite the signifi cance of hypernorms, however, Donaldson and Dunfee make no 
attempt to further explore the philosophical status and justifi cation. Donaldson and 
Dunfee (1999a, 14) touch on the philosophical diffi culties of such an endeavor and 
maintain that a “view from nowhere,” that is “a view that is universal, dispassionate, 
and impartial,” is not feasible. However, they decline to take a position on whether 
hypernorms have a rational (as proposed in the Kantian tradition) or an empirical 
or historical foundation (as proposed in the Hegelian tradition), and even claim that 
it is not necessary to resolve the underlying epistemological questions in order to 
identify hypernorms (59). Instead, they claim to remain “agnostic on the ultimate 
source of hypernorms” (74). 
 Donaldson and Dunfee offer a kind of checklist that includes what they call “types 
of evidence” in support of a hypernorm presumption (60). The authors maintain that 
this checklist may help to confi rm or disconfi rm the presumption that a particular 
norm or principle can count as a hypernorm:
  1.  Widespread consensus that the principle is universal 
  2.  Component of well-known global industry standards 
  3.  Supported by prominent nongovernmental organizations such as the International 
Labour Organization or Transparency International 
  4.  Supported by regional government organizations such as the European 
Community, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, or the 
Organization of American States 
  5.  Consistently referred to as a global ethical standard by international media 
  6.  Known to be consistent with precepts of major religions 
  7.  Supported by global business organizations such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce or the Caux Round Table 
  8.  Known to be consistent with precepts of major philosophies 
  9.  Generally supported by a relevant international community of professionals, such as 
accountants or environmental engineers 
  10.  Known to be consistent with fi ndings concerning universal values 
  11.  Supported by the laws of many different countries  
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 At the same time, they also provide a list of factors that may indicate counterev-
idence for the presumption of a hypernorm (60–61):
  1.  Evidence from the presumptive list to the contrary, for example, that the putative 
hypernorm principle does not represent a universal value 
  2.  Evidence from the presumptive list in support of hypernorm status for a mutually 
exclusive principle 
  3.  A decision context such that applying the presumptive hypernorm would result 
in the violation of a widely recognized human right 
  
 Donaldson and Dunfee (61–81) elaborate on issues such as international bribery, 
gender discrimination, market research, and workplace safety in order to show how 
one can assess whether a hypernorm applies when deciding whether or not a certain 
business behavior is ethically acceptable. Although they maintain that “the process is 
relatively easy and noncontroversial” (63), a closer inspection shows that a great deal 
of personal judgment is involved when Donaldson and Dunfee decide on these cases. 
And the criteria that are applied by both authors are not always clear (61–62). Why 
and under what conditions are international standards of nondiscrimination given 
preference over local laws? The authors refer, for example, to religiously grounded 
laws and customs in Saudi Arabia that prohibit women from driving. Why do the 
authors suggest that truth-telling, despite the widespread philosophical, religious, 
and legal mandate to tell the truth, should not be considered a hypernorm that must 
be applied in market research? In this case, the authors refer to consumer research-
ers who fail to reveal that they are not independent but were hired by a fi rm. Why 
and under what conditions are international standards of workplace safety given 
preference to local norms and customs? Here, the authors discuss whether safety 
standards should be waived at a Korean plant of a global chemical fi rm when workers 
refuse to wear helmets due to local customs. 
 III. 
 Donaldson and Dunfee’s ISCT has been well received in the literature, inspired 
an intensive debate, and encouraged a wealth of theoretical and empirical studies 
(see, e.g., Brenkert  2009 ; Dempsey  2011 ; Dunfee, Smith, and Ross  1999 ; Hartman, 
Shaw, and Stevenson  2003 ; Robertson  2009 ; Spicer  2009 ; Wempe  2009 ). However, 
there have also been unresolved concerns with regards to the foundations of 
their framework (see, e.g., Calton  2006 ; Douglas  2000 ; Gilbert and Behnam 
 2009 ; Rowan  2001 ; Soule  2002 ; Soule, Hedahl, and Dienhart  2009 ; Steinmann 
and Scherer  1997 ,  1998a ). Although Donaldson and Dunfee discuss the process 
of identifying hypernorms in some detail, a number of critical questions and 
interrelated issues still remain with regards to the search for and justifi cation of 
hypernorms (see Dunfee  2006 for concessions). In the following I point to a few 
limitations of their framework. 
 Justifi cation of Hypernorms and “Types of Evidence” 
 Donaldson and Dunfee do not elaborate on or justify their proposed checklists; in 
fact, their types of evidence and counterevidence appear ad hoc. It seems that the “types 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/beq.2015.36
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Karger Libri ISA Ltd, on 28 Aug 2018 at 16:55:32, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Business Ethics Quarterly494
of evidence” enjoy a kind of metastatus as they serve as a kingmaker for hypernorms 
within the ISCT conception. Yet, their philosophical status is not further explored 
(see, e.g., Dunfee  2006 , 305, on “praxis”). This is not a trivial issue as it is not clear 
whether and why any of these types of evidence  deserve to be acknowledged as a warrant 
for the hypernorm status of a particular norm. When a business norm is consistent with 
so-called industry standards, precepts of major religions, and major philosophies, and 
supposedly supported by prominent NGOs and global business organizations, what does 
this tell us? Does this make the norm justifi ed? Should we stop asking critical questions? 
Should we not be even more critical and aware that the types of evidence are likely to be 
infl uenced by prevailing ideologies, power differentials, and social imbalances (see, e.g., 
Banerjee, Chio, and Mir  2009 ; Berenskoetter and Williams  2007 )? I am not convinced 
that the identifi cation of hypernorms is as “easy and uncontroversial” as Donaldson and 
Dunfee ( 1999a , 63) explain. And even if it is “relatively easy” (63) in some cases, what 
do we do in all the other cases where it is diffi cult and controversial? Donaldson and 
Dunfee do not provide a solution for this problem and, Dunfee (2006, 308) concedes: 
“It is a fair conclusion that some of those applying ISCT have had nontrivial diffi culties 
in identifying hypernorms.” 
 Methodological Issues 
 Donaldson and Dunfee are not clear about whether the proposed list is complete—one 
could ask why the authors propose eleven types of evidence, and not ten or twelve? And 
why do they propose three types of counterevidence, and not two or four? Consequently, 
one may ask whether and under what conditions additional factors could or should be 
included, and when certain types of (counter)evidence should be replaced or abandoned. 
Indeed, if one explores the matter more deeply, a number of further methodological 
issues emerge that also need to be addressed. For example, it is not obvious on what 
scale of measure the hypernorm status of norms is intended to be understood (nominal, 
ordinal, or ratio scale) and how the scale of measure relates different hypernorms to 
each other. It is not obvious how the various types of evidence may be weighted or how 
evidence and counterevidence may be balanced against each other in order to address 
the emerging trade-offs. What should we do when we realize that there is no coherence 
between, say, industry standards, religious precepts, and what is supported by NGOs? 
It appears that one needs some form of metacriteria or metaprocedure to check and 
prioritize the various types of evidence in order to remedy these issues. Unfortunately, 
this is not provided; instead, Donaldson and Dunfee seem to abandon argumentation 
and argumentation rules as the key measures to resolve justifi cation issues (see their 
critical remarks against procedural conceptions of morality, Donaldson and Dunfee 
 1999a , 55–56). The authors provide a list of rules of thumb that may help to arbitrate 
confl icts within and among communities (Donaldson and Dunfee  1999a , 179–91). 
However, these rules are not suffi cient to set priorities among hypernorms. 
 Power Games 
 The authors seem to assume that the norms and values that are embedded both implic-
itly and explicitly in the various sources they refer to in their types of evidence are true 
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(i.e., they are or can be identifi ed and described correctly) and right (i.e., they rationally 
deserve agreement or can be defended rationally). Donaldson and Dunfee question 
neither their epistemic nor normative validity, but instead treat the types of evidence as 
self-evident. In particular, the authors neglect to consider that the various standards 
and institutions they refer to are often highly contested and likely to be the result of 
power games between opposing interests and/or epistemic or ideological positions 
(see, e.g., Banerjee, Chio, and Mir  2009 ; Bleiker  2000 ). This applies to governmental 
regulations and international institutions (Barnett and Finnemore  1999 ; Berenskoetter 
and Williams  2007 ) as much as to major philosophies (Baynes, Bohman, and McCarthy 
 1987 ) or social science paradigms (Burrell and Morgan  1979 ). Even more so, the 
authors neglect to consider that the precepts of major religions are inherently ideolog-
ical in the sense that their rationality is not refl ected and that their rules of conduct are 
not questioned (Foucault  1980 ). Therefore, one has to question whether these items 
can serve as evidence for the identifi cation and justifi cation of hypernorms. 
 Moral Dilemmas and Paradoxes 
 Donaldson and Dunfee seem to assume that all hypernorms are mutually compatible 
and thus provide a consistent and logically coherent set of rules. This is apparent, for 
example, in the proposed second counterevidence, which requires that hypernorm 
principles not be mutually exclusive. However, the authors fail to take into account 
that modern societies are complex and ambiguous. Seen from a global perspective, 
legal rules, cultural expectations, and moral values differ widely, not just across 
societies but also within. Legal fragmentation (Berman  2009 ; Michaels  2009 ; Young 
 2012 ) and cultural pluralism (Thomas  2000 ; Teubner and Korth  2012 ) seem to be 
characteristic of our (post)modern epoch. Today, societies consist of incompatible 
institutional and moral demands, and both individuals and business organizations 
have to resolve moral dilemmas (Calton and Payne  2003 ) and institutional com-
plexity (see, e.g., Greenwood et al.  2011 ; Pache and Santos  2010 ). In international 
business, it is often possible to observe paradoxes when principles, norms, and values 
that are “contradictory yet interrelated […] exist simultaneously and persist over 
time” (Smith and Lewis  2011 , 382). Under these conditions, the assumption of the 
existence of a coherent set of hypernorms may be no more than what Donaldson 
and Dunfee see as something to “hope” for (Donaldson and Dunfee  1999a , 44). 
 History and Learning 
 The authors do not suffi ciently discuss the conditions, possibilities, and limitations of 
learning at either the individual or community level. The types of evidence and the 
assumed hypernorms, it appears, are readily available, being ahistorical phenomena. 
Thus historical or spatial development is neither suffi ciently addressed nor critically 
reconstructed. Hypernorms appear to be quite static, despite the well-balanced interrela-
tionship between the macro and the micro levels of contracts in Donaldson and Dunfee’s 
Integrative Social Contracts Theory and their reference to a possible “convergence.” 
The conception does not suffi ciently consider the historical or spatial dynamics of 
hypernorms, and their possible progression or regression. The hypernorms and the 
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embedded “fundamental conceptions of the right and the good” (52) are not conceived 
of as a cultural phenomenon made by humans, with a history and an open future. 
Dunfee has also conceded this issue (see Dunfee  2006 , 310–11) and Donaldson has 
only briefl y commented on the dynamics of hypernorms (see Donaldson  2009 ). 
 Regressions 
 In the course of human and moral development, regressions cannot be excluded 
(Horkheimer and Adorno  1972 ). With their convergence rhetoric, however, Donaldson 
and Dunfee seem to implicitly assume that the various types of evidence are the 
result of a progressive development toward a stronger homogeneity and institu-
tionalization of rules of ethical conduct. For example, that which is supported by 
regional government organizations, the “laws of many different countries,” or the 
“global ethical standard by international media,” among other types of evidence 
(Donaldson and Dunfee  1999a , 60), is considered appropriate benchmarks of ethical 
business conduct. However, these institutions may fail due to elitist discourses that 
focus only on technical rationality (Beck  2010 ; Crouch  2004 ), power games, lack of 
transparency within procedures (Barnett and Finnemore  1999 ; Mattli and Buthe 
 2003 ), or the infl uence of the media and strong industrial lobbying groups (Herman 
and Chomsky  1988 ; Marcuse  1964 ). These institutional failures may provoke moral 
regressions; for example, business fi rms and governmental institutions may abandon 
privacy rights or other human rights in the “war on terror” (Michaels  2008 ; Richards 
 2013 ). The involvement of some computer and software fi rms in the transfer of 
personal data to national intelligence agencies is just one of many examples of how 
ethical business conduct may be compromised (Greenwald  2014 ; Zuboff  2015 ). 
 In summary, Donaldson and Dunfee build on the hypothesized convergence of 
various international standards and institutions (mentioned in their types of evidence) 
and assume these standards and institutions are generally accepted across cultures. The 
authors are quite confi dent that such a convergence can be observed and confi rmed in 
empirical research. On this basis they derive normative orientations for ethical business 
conduct in order to bridge the gap between what is and what ought to be. However, 
despite this sophisticated endeavor of an indirect justifi cation of hypernorms, one may 
critically note that the selection process of hypernorms may be “self-serving” (Soule 
 2002 , 119) and possibly biased toward the preferences of particular social groups 
(e.g., white male academics from the West) (Shaw  2000 ), so that a considerable “risk 
of error and manipulation” (Soule  2002 , 119) cannot be avoided. Therefore, one may 
conclude that hypernorms are not suffi ciently justifi ed and “that the normative context 
of ISCT is too vague to serve the needs of students and practitioners” (115).  2  
 As a result, fundamental philosophical questions remain: How can we identify 
hypernorms? And how can we justify hypernorms? I will approach these questions 
from a philosophical perspective. 
 IV. 
 The possibility of a universal justifi cation of moral norms is a matter of intense 
debate in philosophy (see, e.g., Habermas  1994 ; MacIntyre  1988 ; Rorty  1986 ). 
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The skepticism against universal justifi cations is widespread within schools of 
thought as different as positivist philosophy (Albert  1985 ; Popper  1959 ) and post-
modern theory (Lyotard  1984 ). Three main arguments are advanced against the 
possibility of a universal justifi cation of norms: logical impossibility, empirical 
infeasibility, and political undesirability. 
 Regarding logical impossibility, adherents of  positivist philosophy such as Karl 
Popper ( 1959 ) or Hans Albert ( 1985 ,  1987 ) argue that logical deduction is the only 
proper form of justifi cation in philosophy and the sciences (for a critical analysis, 
see Apel  1976 ,  1987 ; Mittelstrass  1985 ). The logical impossibility of a fi nal justifi -
cation can be shown when exploring the reasoning game between a proponent and 
an opponent who is a skeptic. If an opponent questions Assertion A  3  put forward 
by a proponent, the proponent has to advance Assertion B from which Assertion A 
can logically be deduced, so that it logically follows from B (B → A). However, the 
opponent can respond by questioning Assertion B. Therefore, a fi nal justifi cation is 
not reached until the proponent can justify Assertion B. This makes it necessary to 
advance Assertion C from which Assertion B can then logically be deduced (C → B). 
However, Assertion C can again be questioned, which requires the proponent to 
advance Assertion D in support of Assertion C (D → C), and so forth. As one can 
see, this process leads to an  infi nite regress , which is not suffi cient for justifi cation. 
Popper and Albert maintain that, logically, there are only two alternatives to avoid 
an infi nite regress. One option is to advance an assertion whose validity has already 
been questioned in a previous step of the reasoning game. For example, Assertion 
A could be advanced as a justifi cation for Assertion C (A → C). This, however, 
leads to a  logical circle , which again is not suffi cient for justifi cation. The other 
option is to stop justifying, that is, to break off reasoning and instead to insist on the 
original Assertion A. This, however, will still leave the skeptical opponent unsat-
isfi ed. Therefore, neither infi nite regress, logical circle, nor breaking off reasoning 
will resolve the logical problem of justifi cation.  4  Can this philosophical problem 
be resolved? If so, how? As I will show below, the challenge is twofold: to develop 
a suitable understanding of justifi cation and to defi ne the right starting point from 
which any justifi cation can proceed. 
 The second argument is empirical infeasibility. A more empiricist variant of 
positivist philosophy relies less on logic and more on empirical insights. Empiricists 
suggest searching for social rules that are accepted across various social communi-
ties. Once such social rules are identifi ed empirically, they may serve as candidates 
for universally accepted norms. However, empirical fi ndings are not suffi cient to 
justify normative claims, as this kind of reasoning comes into confl ict with the 
so-called is–ought problem, as explained by Hume ([1739]  1896 ): What “should be” 
cannot simply be deduced from what “is.” Thus, empirical conceptions need to avoid 
“an objectivist assimilation of our normative practices to observable events in the 
world” (Habermas  2003a , 23). Therefore, it is at issue whether and how social rules 
that are accepted within a particular community or even across multiple communities 
can be universalized so that they can be considered as justifi ed in any social community. 
The challenge is to assess the validity of norms by showing how empirical acceptance 
can lead to universal justifi cation. Donaldson and Dunfee, in seeking to avoid the 
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impending is–ought problem, select a more sophisticated approach. They provide a 
list of types of evidence in order to argue for “the convergence of religious, cultural, 
and philosophical beliefs around certain core principles” (Donaldson and Dunfee 
 1994 , 265). Evidently, they aim to derive some indirect support for hypernorms. 
However, as seen above, this does not work. 
 The third argument is political undesirability. Adherents of postmodernism reject 
the idea of a universal justifi cation of social norms (Lyotard  1984 ; Rosenau  1992 ). For 
postmodernists, a universal justifi cation is an attempt to make one particular opinion 
dominant over other opinions and to suppress and marginalize other voices. The aim 
of postmodernism, therefore, is to protect the pluralism of social communities with 
their heterogeneous values, norms, and lifestyles. It rejects the idea of convergence, 
homogeneity, and unity and instead favors divergence, heterogeneity, and difference. 
The elaborations by Clegg and Gray are exemplary of this kind of thinking:
 In this phase of thought, which characterizes the current sociological thinking about glo-
balization, there is a realization that convergence is neither necessary nor desirable; that 
individual entities differ greatly across national societies, as well as within them; 
that culture is critical; and that convergence is less likely and less productive than 
divergence. These themes become characteristic of postmodernism. (Clegg and Gray 
 1996 , 299) 
 Postmodernists maintain that norms enjoy validity and acceptance only  within social 
communities and should not be extended beyond the boundaries of a particular 
community. This is because applying the norms of one social community to another 
community can be considered a form of cultural imperialism (Beauchamp  2010 ), 
where one community dominates by imposing its views on other communities. 
The challenge is to fi nd a way to universalize norms and institutions as much 
as possible, but only as much as necessary, in order to establish a peaceful plurality 
under the conditions of contemporary societies, with their pluralism of incompatible 
rules, values, and lifestyles (Lorenzen  1987a ). 
 V. 
 In the face of these problems, the universal justifi cation of moral norms seems to be a 
challenging, if not an impossible, task. However, three variations of discourse–ethics 
in contemporary German philosophy take account of these challenges and develop 
answers to the problem of (universal) justifi cation: (1) The  transcendental–pragmatic 
philosophy of Karl-Otto Apel, (2) the  universal–pragmatic philosophy of Jürgen 
Habermas, and (3) the  methodical constructivist philosophy of the Erlangen School 
of Paul Lorenzen and others.  5  Given the restrictions of this article, I can only describe 
the general ideas of these philosophies (for more detailed discussions, see Gethmann 
 1992 ; Scherer  2003 ,  2009 ; Scherer and Patzer  2011 ; Steinmann  2007 ; Steinmann 
and Scherer  1997 ,  1998a ,  1998b ; Wohlrapp  2014 , xl–xliii). 
 First, I want to point out that these philosophical schools build on two 
achievements in contemporary philosophy: (1) the linguistic turn, and (2) the 
pragmatic turn. All three schools of thought also develop a certain conception 
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of procedural ethics: they advance  discourse ethics and justify procedural rules 
for an argumentation process that helps to assess the normative validity of moral 
rules and values. 
 The  linguistic turn in philosophy (Rorty  1967 ,  1992 ) means that the philosophical 
analysis of phenomena must be conducted as the analysis of language use with regard 
to these phenomena. This builds on the insight that we do not have an uninterpreted 
or direct access to reality. Rather, our access is made possible and fi ltered by the use 
of language and conceptual schemes. Philosophy after the linguistic turn rejects the 
naïve realism that the world is out there and that our assertions about the world can 
be controlled by their correspondence with “reality” (see, critically, Rorty  1979 ). 
This idea of the linguistic turn has implications for both epistemic and normative 
claims (truth and morality) (Habermas  2003a ,  2003b ; Kamlah and Lorenzen  1984 ). 
 The  pragmatic turn (Bernstein  2010 ) tells us that the subjects of philosophical 
analysis are not detached from actual practice, but are embedded in and enacted 
by practice. Therefore, all concepts we use are founded in practice and derive their 
meaning from practice. This has implications for how we cope with reality and how our 
language, actions, and experiences are controlled (Apel  1980 ; Kamlah and Lorenzen 
 1984 ; Lorenzen [1968] 1987 ).
 From a pragmatist perspective, reality is not something to be copied; we take note of it 
performatively—as the totality of resistances that are processed and are to be anticipated—
and it makes itself known to us solely in the constraints to which our problem-solving 
activities and learning processes are subject. (Habermas  2003a , 27) 
 All three philosophical schools apply these ideas to the problem of justifi cation. 
They aim to reconstruct the argumentation rules that one implicitly applies when 
arguing about the validity of normative claims. 
 All three philosophical approaches contribute to the development of  discourse 
ethics, which is concerned with the justifi cation of normative claims or moral 
truths (Gilbert and Behnam  2009 ; Habermas  1990 ,  1995a ; Rasche and Scherer  2015 ; 
Scherer and Patzer  2011 ; Stansbury  2009 ). From a discourse–ethical perspective, 
the validity of moral claims cannot be justifi ed by an isolated individual refl ecting 
monologically upon the world, but can be validated only intersubjectively in 
argumentation processes. Therefore, discourse ethics aims to reconstruct the ideal 
communicative conditions under which individuals can check validity claims by 
way of rational argumentation. These ideal conditions serve as a “regulative 
idea”: Only those norms can enjoy validity upon which a qualifi ed consensus, 
that is, a consensus under ideal conditions among competent individuals who 
are affected by the norm, has been achieved. Discourse ethics is a deontological 
ethics insofar as it is rule based (with regards to rules of communication). And it 
is a cognitivist ethics insofar as it argues that the validity of moral claims can be 
checked analogous to the validity of truth claims. As I show, there are variations 
on how these communicative rules can be justifi ed and whether and how they 
can be universalized so that they can be used as procedural hypernorms to check 
the validity of norms across different communities (for an overview, see, e.g., 
Scherer and Patzer  2011 ; Steinmann and Scherer  1998b ).  6  
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 VI. 
 The  transcendental pragmatics of Karl-Otto Apel (1976, 1980, 1987; for an overview, 
see Kettner  1996 ; Mendieta  2002 ) is part of the Kantian endeavor of transcendental 
philosophy that aims to reconstruct the a priori conditions of cognizing about an 
object of experience and cognition (cf. Kant  1996 , 64). However, Apel abandons 
the solipsistic idea that the cognizing subject can monologically realize reality and 
develop knowledge in isolation from other cognizing subjects; rather, he considers 
communicative intersubjectivity as the key to realizing, understanding, and crit-
icizing social phenomena. Apel develops a universal conception of discourse ethics 
referring to culturally invariant conditions of the possibility of communication. Apel 
claims to provide a universal concept of communication and an  ultimate justifi cation 
( Letztbegründung ) of ethical principles. In particular, he assumes absolute validity 
for his proposed procedure of norm evaluation. Apel’s concept of discourse ethics 
provides principles of argumentation that guide the procedure for the analysis of 
normative questions. 
 The ultimate justifi cation of transcendental pragmatics rests on the concept of 
retorsion ( performativer Selbstwiderspruch ) . This concept can be explained by 
pointing out the contradiction between the content of an assertion and the action of 
making an assertion. A skeptic who presents the argument that “There is no universal 
claim!” is asserting a universal claim, and by presenting the argument, contradicts 
its content. For Apel, it logically follows that universal claims exist and that they 
can be justifi ed. Apel argues that the concept of retorsion can be employed not only 
to test factual assertions, but also to serve as a  method in fi ctional debates with 
potential skeptics in order to reconstruct the rules of argumentation. Consequently, 
Apel explores hypothetical questions that a skeptical opponent may ask, and thus 
reconstructs the rules of argumentation that cannot be questioned without giving 
rise to self-contradiction. 
 In developing these rules, Apel argues that any participant who makes an 
assertion must already assume that it can be tested according to an implicit set 
of universal rules of argumentation. Thus, these rules apply to each participant 
in an argumentation, since a rejection of these rules would be self-contradictory, 
and not just on the level of language use but also on the level of actual deeds, 
which echoes the linguistic–pragmatic foundation of his conception. Thereby, the 
transcendental–pragmatic conception attempts to rescue a unifi ed and universal 
notion of justifi cation as “communicative reason,” because anyone who argumen-
tatively challenges an idea of communicative reason automatically makes use 
of it. The conception thus claims universal validity in all moral communities. 
 VII. 
 Habermas is the most prominent living member of the Frankfurt School of Social 
Research, the origin of what is known as “critical theory” (Rasmussen  1996 ; Scherer 
 2009 ). Habermas attempts to reconstruct the normative foundations of critical theory 
by focusing on the possibility of undistorted communication that is built into the 
structure of any language (Habermas  1976 ). Based on his close collaboration with 
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Apel at the University of Frankfurt a. M. in Germany, Habermas ( 1976 ) further devel-
ops the insights of linguistic and pragmatic philosophers—for example, J. L. Austin, 
C. S. Pierce, and J. Searl, among others—and suggests that a speaker raises (up to) four 
validity claims when making an utterance. The fi rst is intelligibility  7  : the speaker 
claims that what he or she says can be understood. The second is truth: the speaker 
claims that his or her assertion is true. Third is rightness (or legitimacy), in which 
the speaker claims that he or she is entitled to make a claim; and fourth is sincerity: 
the speaker claims to be sincere. In principle, an opponent who is a skeptic can 
challenge any of these claims in a concrete discourse. 
 Habermas suggests that any participant in a communicative interaction presupposes 
that under ideal conditions his or her claims can be scrutinized and verifi ed (or falsifi ed) 
in an open discourse. Participants do so regardless of the fact that actual communication 
is systematically distorted (for example, by uneven distribution of power among the 
participants) and usually falls short of this ideal. Yet discussants are routinely making 
this counter-factual assumption because efforts of communication would otherwise 
fail or not even be attempted. The ideal conditions of a free and transparent discourse 
are characterized by Habermas ( 1995b , 56) as “the freedom of access, equal rights 
to participate, truthfulness on the part of participants, absence of coercion in taking 
positions and so forth.” Habermas suggests that these conditions must be understood 
as the “unavoidable presuppositions of argumentation,” which apply to any social 
community regardless of the culture or nation (Habermas  1995b , 56). 
 For Habermas, the postmodernist skepticism toward the unity of reason and 
criticism against conceptions of universal morality are valid concerns. However, 
he rejects the postmodern mistrust that universalism would assimilate heterogeneity, 
leveling cultural differences or marginalizing other voices. Instead, he defends his 
approach of what he thinks is a “properly understood” universalism (Habermas 
 2001b , xxxv). The postmodern mistrust appears misleading, since a correctly under-
stood community does not constitute itself through concrete material moral norms 
of how to live a good life, but rather through procedural norms of argumentation and 
the “negative idea of abolishing discrimination” (Habermas  2001b , xxxvi). With this 
argument, Habermas also counters criticism advanced against his discourse ethics 
because of its allegedly “thin” morality, in that it may not put suffi cient emphasis on 
the promotion of particular moral values (see, for example, the criticism by Michael 
Walzer mentioned earlier). 
 Habermas presents a developed conception of discourse ethics that takes into account 
the differences between cultures with different values and morals. He explicitly 
wishes to avoid the “lingering foundationalism” in Apel’s philosophy (see Habermas 
 1995b , 79). Thus, Habermas does not claim ultimate justifi cation for his proposed 
ethical principles and the principles of argumentation. Instead, he points out that 
any philosopher is always embedded in the argumentative praxis of a specifi c 
“sociocultural form of life” where—for the time being—moral rules and values are 
taken for granted (Habermas  2001c ,  2001d ,  2003a ,  2003b ). He argues that although 
a philosopher can partly distance himself or herself from the social community 
in which he or she is embedded, the philosopher cannot entirely dispose of his or 
her cultural and historical legacy in order to acquire the perspective of a neutral 
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observer from outside the social world (Habermas  1995b , 81 et seq.). Such a “view 
from nowhere,” as Donaldson and Dunfee (1999a, 14) have called it, is not possible. 
 Habermas describes problem-solving behavior as emerging from the practices 
of the lifeworld, from background assumptions, routines, and practical dealings 
with the world, that are naïvely taken for granted as long as they work as an available 
and unproblematic resource to manage one’s life. These assumptions are only 
challenged and problematized at pivotal points, for example, when routines fail or 
contradictions arise. “As a result, what has hitherto been taken for granted and thus 
accepted as valid comes to be seen as merely ‘presumed truths,’ that is, as funda-
mentally problematic truth claims” (Habermas  2003a , 39). It is only at these pivotal 
points that a transition from (more or less unrefl ective) action to refl ective discourse 
takes place. In such instances, validity claims are checked to understand why there is 
a problem and to develop answers to questions of truth or rightness so that solutions 
to what has become problematical can be achieved. 
 In his elaborations on the implications of linguistic and pragmatic turns, Habermas 
( 2003a ) emphasizes the role of learning and explores the temporal and spatial dynam-
ics of knowledge creation. In doing so, he argues, “subjects capable of speech and 
action, who can be affected by reasons, can learn—and in the long run even ‘cannot 
not learn’” (8). He suggests that this possibility of learning embraces both the epis-
temic  and the moral dimension: “[T]hey learn just as much in the moral–cognitive 
dimension of interacting with one another as they do in the cognitive dimension 
of interacting with the world” (8). This is an important aspect in Habermas’s more 
recent philosophical thinking. Habermas holds that we can revise our knowledge, 
regardless of whether it is conceptual, technical, or ethical–political, in the light of 
experiences that we make when coping with the world. This includes both the natural 
and the social worlds. “Empirical judgments are  formed in learning processes and 
 emerge from how problems are solved” (26). This is because “in our daily coping 
as well as in experiments, we rub up against constraints” (27). 
 With regard to the truth claims in the epistemic realm, these constraints are defi ned by 
the restrictions of an objective world that infl uence whether and to what extent our 
actions are successful or not. By conceding a “weak naturalism” of his conception 
(22–30), Habermas argues that truth claims are not merely checked on the level of 
language and controlled by the achieved consensus, but are also controlled vis-à-vis 
an objective world. The tricky question, however, is how these practical “constraints” 
can be understood in the moral realm where the restrictions are not determined by a 
natural world but are made by humans in the social world. Individuals are embedded 
in a particular social community where moral values, principles, and rules are taken 
for granted as sources for practical orientation. They are not questioned unless the 
practice fails and confl icts emerge (or are likely to emerge), and then these practical 
certainties are reconsidered. “Instead of the resistance of objects, which we run up 
against in the lifeworld, here we have the opposition of other social actors whose 
value orientation confl ict with ours” (42). This marks an important difference on 
how epistemic and moral beliefs are controlled by coping with the world. “For moral 
beliefs do not falter against the resistance of an objective world that all participants 
suppose to be one and the same. Rather they falter against the irresolubility of normative 
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dissensus among opposing parties in a shared social world” (Habermas  2003b , 256). 
This has consequences on how these problems may be resolved:
 To be sure, moral beliefs do guide (normatively) rule-governed social interactions in a 
similar way that empirical beliefs guide goal-oriented interventions in the objective 
world. However, they are implicitly corroborated in a different way—not by successfully 
manipulating otherwise independently occurring processes, but by consensually resolving 
confl icts of interaction. (256) 
 With regards to social action within constitutional democracies, Habermas (2003a, 
42–49) refers to the process of legislation with the help of which modern societies 
regulate confl icts among its members in a peaceful manner. He argues that this must 
be conceived of as an open process of constructing new rules in order to address 
new issues or unexamined situations that we experience the more complex societies 
become. With this conception, he breaks new ground and distances himself from 
the deontological natural law conceptions of morality: “Constructivism replaces the 
static eternal validity of natural law with a dynamic, prudential, and, at the same time, 
morally insightful process of legislation” (47). 
 However, what can serve as moral orientation for individuals and institutions from 
both posttraditional and traditional societies? How and in what sense can we build 
on and extend this model in order to address intercultural confl icts that take place 
outside the realm of democratic institutions? How should the relationship between 
theory and practice be adequately understood in order to address the problem of 
infi nite regress? Here, the constructivist approach may be of help. 
 IX. 
 In critical debates with skeptical perspectives (see Section IV), the constructivist 
approach of the Erlangen School defends the feasibility of justifi cation (Mittelstrass 
 1985 ). This approach was initiated by Paul Lorenzen and Wilhelm Kamlah at the 
University of Erlangen in Germany in the 1960s (Kamlah and Lorenzen  1984 ; 
Lorenzen  1987a ,  1987b ) and has been further developed since then (Butts and Brown 
 1989 ; Mittelstrass 2005–2016). Constructivism shares the sense for actual practices 
with the Habermasian approach, but goes beyond Habermas in two respects. 
 First, constructivists consider Habermas’s pragmatic turn too superfi cial: 
“Habermas’s perspective is ‘pragmatic’ in the sense of a moderate reference to 
lifeworld concerns and to the performative nature of speech. A reference to further 
praxes or even to the practice of research regarding problems of orientation cannot 
be found in his work” (Wohlrapp  2014 , 299). By contrast, constructivists maintain 
that the meaning of moral concepts such as argumentation, reason, and norm can 
only be understood by referring to the constitutive role of social practices in which 
these words are embedded. This builds on the insight that “the meaning of a word 
is its use in the language” (Wittgenstein  2009 , 43). This, of course, leads to the 
question of how cultural relativism can be avoided when normative concepts are 
not considered transcendental but are embedded in a particular practice of language 
use. Constructivism responds to these concerns by stating that reason is not to be 
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understood as a universal criterion but as a cultural achievement, as a “culture of 
reason” (Kambartel  1984 ,  1989a ,  1989b ) that is based on an inclusive practice of 
peaceful confl ict resolution by argumentation. 
 Second, Habermas’s (1996) approach to discourse ethics assumes a context for 
confl ict resolution that is already more or less institutionalized. Despite his focus 
on deliberations above and beyond political institutions of democratic society, his 
conception of deliberative democracy  presumes these institutions (see, critically, 
Baur and Arenas,  2014 ). This makes it diffi cult to account for intercultural confl icts 
in (largely) unregulated environments or interactions where no mutually accepted 
rules exist. Constructivism, by contrast, explores how confl icts between incompatible 
values and forms of life can be addressed when a common, practical, institutional 
basis is severely lacking (see, particularly, Gethmann  1998 ; Wohlrapp  1998 ,  2014 ). 
This makes the constructivist approach helpful for exploring the role of hypernorms. 
 Constructivism conceives of  actual practice as both the cause and the methodical 
starting point of theory building (Mittelstrass  1977 ; Scherer and Dowling  1995 ). 
It is based on the insight that human beings do possess capabilities to master their 
lives more or less successfully, even before they develop or apply any theories. Since 
practice is not always successful, theorizing becomes necessary in order to address 
problems. This is why practice can be considered the  cause of theory building: If we 
were always successful in our lives, there would be no need for theory. Yet, because 
practice does not always fail, it becomes possible to build on these (partly) success-
ful practices and routines as the ultimate condition and  starting point of theoretical 
endeavors. In this sense, methodical refl ection represents a stylized reconstruction 
of actual practices (see Lorenzen [1968] 1987 , 5).
 [Constructivists] are concerned to show how the concepts of science result initially from 
activity involved in daily practical behavior. All theoretical concepts are grounded in dis-
tinctions made, practical orientations taken, in what Husserl in his later writings called the 
 Lebenswelt , the pre-refl exive, pre-scientifi c, pre-philosophical world that nevertheless guides 
scientifi c and philosophical refl ection. It is the familiar world in which we all live, a world 
taken for granted, [...] a world that is pragmatically a priori. (Butts and Brown  1989 , xvi) 
 Thus, constructivism escapes the problem of infi nite regress because it builds on 
actual practice as the uncircumventable a priori of theory building (Mittelstrass  1985 ):
 [C]onstructivists are not faced with the embarrassment of an infi nite regress that plagues 
various forms of fundamentalism in philosophy of science. In order to justify some 
claim  P , they claim  Q ; in order to justify  Q , they claim  R , and so on; in principle the 
process never ends. But because constructivists locate the ultimate basis of theory in 
practical activity, they do not have this problem. Pragmatic operations, unlike propo-
sitional truth claims, are the kind of thing that does not stand in need of justifi cation 
of any sort. A recipe works in application, or it does not. It is the aim of constructivist 
“reconstruction” to discover what activities and operations successfully generate the 
various concepts that are central to the sciences. (Butts and Brown  1989 , xvii) 
 Following this perspective, Kambartel ( 1989b ,  1989c ,  1991 ,  1998 ) questions the 
possibility of developing a theoretical or—what Putnam (1981, 110) calls—a “ criterial 
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conception of rationality […] according to which there are institutionalized norms 
which defi ne what is or is not rationally acceptable.” Kambartel suggests not applying 
a universal principle or rule of argumentation that transcends all social communities. 
Rather, we are participants in specifi c situations wherein we produce judgments and 
orientations for action. We learn the use of communicative reason by making use 
of different criteria as participants of a specifi c, shared culture in which we have 
become socialized. Only by being embedded in a particular practice can we become 
capable of argumentation and learn what it means to handle confl icts in a reasonable 
way. Hence, we are not born as reasonable beings but rather become such through 
socialization, education, and self-refl ection (Kambartel  1989b ). Consequently, 
Kambartel argues that any philosophical endeavors concerning communicative 
reason need, as a starting point, this  culture of reason , since any notion of reason 
or other normative concepts such as argumentation, consensus, or norm cannot be 
understood without such a pragmatic being embedded in a particular practice. The 
notion of reason cannot be gained by a philosopher’s theoretical refl ection alone, 
but requires a close connection to its underlying practice. 
 Lorenzen’s ([1981] 1987 , 1987a, 1987c, 1989) approach to political anthropology 
and political knowledge follows a similar path but is more specifi c with regards to 
the institutional embedding of communicative reason. According to Lorenzen ( 1987a ), 
it is the task of ethical politics to peacefully mitigate the confl icts that arise within 
posttraditional societies due to the heterogeneity of values, expectations, and life-
styles of individuals. Lorenzen follows the pragmatic turn in philosophy by making 
the (at least partly) successful political practice of stabilizing peace through open 
discourses in democratic institutions the starting point of a methodical refl ection 
on rational argumentation and the public use of reason (for related ideas on the 
priority of democratic practice to philosophy, see also Gethmann  1992 ; Habermas 
 2003a , 47–48; Rorty  1991 ). The argumentative practice of confl ict resolution based 
on binding laws that are agreed upon in free and open public discourses contribute 
to stabilizing peace and help to transform the pluralism of incompatible values and 
expectations into a “plurality of mutually compatible life forms” (Lorenzen  1987a , 
233 et seq.; translation by the author). In doing so, Lorenzen’s approach differs from 
the universalistic conceptions of Apel and (the earlier) Habermas that reconstruct 
the conditions of communication by analyzing dyadic relationships between indi-
viduals. At the time of its publication, Lorenzen’s approach (Lorenzen  [1981] 1987 , 
 1987a ) seemed to preempt Habermas’s (1996) later developments with regards to 
democratic discourses in institutional contexts and the pragmatic turn of Habermas’s 
conception (Habermas  1998 ,  2003a ,  2003b ). 
 Whereas Lorenzen and Kambartel focus on confl ict resolution and argumentation 
 within posttraditional societies (see, critically, Gethmann  1992 ), Wohlrapp ( 1998 , 
 2014 ) loosens this contextual condition and explores confl icts among representatives 
of traditional and posttraditional cultures, where “[t]here are no or too few unprob-
lematic interactions which might be able to provide the practical basis for a common 
normative order” (Wohlrapp  1998 , 58). How is social interaction possible when 
individuals do not share the same values and social skills as part of their respective 
culture? Wohlrapp (1998, 59) suggests a three-step procedure “in which interaction 
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with members of foreign cultures is taken up and the form of this interaction is at 
once explored and shaped such that the separate forms of life become compatible.” 
These three steps are experience, understanding, and producing peaceability. 
In the fi rst step, individuals from different cultures encounter each other as unfamil-
iar beings and  experience this encounter as something enriching or disturbing—the 
latter are the problematic cases. The second step is when individuals want to go 
beyond pure experiences and emotional reactions, so they refl ect on the experience 
of foreignness in order to gain an  understanding . However, this can only be achieved 
relative to one’s own cultural horizon, that is, as an understanding of what is alien 
or foreign as a new variant of one’s own possibilities:
 [I]n order to bring this cognition about, we need something the same or corresponding to 
serve as an identifi cation foil against which the differences appear as differences of form 
only. In this we complete a “distancing.” On the occasion of the concrete experience of 
alienation, we can raise ourselves above the mere immersion or indeed imprisonment in 
a practice and language which we have grown used to. We can recall and examine our 
own conceptual contexts and the practical situations we fi nd ourselves in so that these 
are opened for encountering what is unfamiliar. (Wohlrapp  1998 , 60) 
 In situations where confl icts arise, experience and understanding are not suffi cient 
to achieve peaceful coordination. Rather the opponents have to explore the third 
step, which is whether and how far the creation of compatibility is possible. In order 
to do so, “[i]t is reasonable in the process of arguing to leave aside accustomed 
peculiarities, if they generate incompatibilities, i.e., to distance oneself from them 
for the sake of peace” (65). In order to formulate a normative principle based in this 
insight, Wohlrapp (2014, 401) formulates a  principle of transsubjectivity : “Put your 
subjectivity up for consideration.” Transsubjectivity was originally introduced by 
Lorenzen ( 1987a ), and Wohlrapp explains what it is and is not.
 [It] is not the same as “intersubjectivity.” While “intersubjectivity” denotes either the 
complete suppression of subjectivity […] or a recognition of the merely factual sub-
jectivity of the other […], “transsubjectivity” refers to the heightening of subjectivity 
aimed at the potential for being compatible with the subjectivity of the Other. It is the 
middle ground between simple acceptance and complete suppression. The principle of 
transsubjectivity states that, beginning with my subjectivity, I put my actual ego up for 
consideration as well as heighten and transcend it by seeking to participate in a general 
human potential, which is only attainable by recognizing the subjectivity of the Other. 
(Wohlrapp  2014 , 401) 
 Thus, creating permeability between cultural horizons is not a theoretical solution; 
it is a practical possibility. It is up to the opponents of intercultural confl icts to 
explore whether and how this is realized in a concrete situation. In order to engage 
in a process of mutual learning, all that is required is the willingness to open up 
one’s own horizon. There is no guarantee for success, but in principle the possibility 
exists. Where there is no culture of reason yet established, Kambartel reminds us, 
a “common, reasonable life cannot be achieved in this case without some people fi rst of 
all setting off without a safety net” (Kambartel  1989a , 87; translation by the author). 
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 X. 
 What can we learn from these discourse–ethical considerations for the resolution of 
the problem of justifi cation of hypernorms? In order to draw a conclusion, I want 
to emphasize the following insights: 
 Priority of procedural rules. As we have seen, Donaldson and Dunfee did not 
suffi ciently explore the signifi cance of the  procedure by which (hyper-)norms can 
be identifi ed and justifi ed (Gilbert and Behnam  2009 ; Shaw  2000 ). Therefore, 
I suggest building on the insights of discourse ethics and analyzing the argumentative 
process by which the validity of norms, even the validity of hypernorms, can be 
checked. The proposed conceptions of discourse ethics developed by the German 
philosophers Apel, Habermas, Lorenzen, and others can be considered a helpful 
contribution to the development of such a procedure. Unlike Donaldson and Dunfee, 
I therefore suggest giving  priority to procedural rules that serve as metalevel rules 
for the assessment of structural and substantial (hyper)norms. This builds on the 
insight of the linguistic turn in philosophy: we have no other means to check the 
validity of truth and moral claims than by argumentation. In the literature, there have 
already been several fruitful suggestions on how to enrich Donaldson and Dunfee’s 
ISCT with Habermas’s discourse ethics (see, e.g., Calton  2006 ; Gilbert and Behnam 
 2009 ; Shaw  2000 ). My elaborations follow this path but go one step further. While 
these authors have taken the discourse–ethical approach and its argumentation rules 
for granted, I explore its justifi cations and limitations, especially with respect to dis-
courses among members from radically different cultures and/or discourses outside the 
realm of institutionalized democratic politics (Gethmann  1992 ). Both conditions are 
characteristic of the global economy and the challenges of multinational corporations 
operating in different cultural and institutional environments (Steinmann and Scherer 
 1998a ; Scherer and Palazzo  2011 ). 
 Discovering versus constructing solutions to moral confl icts . The argumentative 
procedure is open to any normative claims concerning values and moral rules to 
be validated, whether these are rationally acceptable or not. These normative claims 
can have their origin in any social or cultural community and can be checked within 
or across communities as long as those who are affected by these claims submit 
their views to a mutual learning process that is directed toward peaceful confl ict 
resolution. This means that the argumentative procedure is not necessarily restricted 
to  discovering rules, that is, to fi nding something that is  already present in the world 
but has not yet been detected. It does not necessarily have to stay within the “moral 
free space” fenced off by some presumed substantive hypernorms. Without doubt, 
most confl icts can be resolved within the realm of present rules and hypernorms. 
But not all confl icts. Therefore, we have to include a creative element, a learning 
process of  constructing new rules and new solutions , which are not readily available 
as new problems emerge. When “new issues arise, new norms must be developed 
and justifi ed in light of new challenges in history” (Habermas  2003a , 44). There-
fore, the search for hypernorms that are assumed to be already present in the world 
(as an convergence of social norms and institutions) may neither be necessary nor 
suffi cient for the resolution of every confl ict. Instead, in cases of confl icts among 
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incompatible values and lifestyles that are radically different from each other, 
new rules for peacefully living with each other may need to be developed that 
go beyond what has been envisioned as hypernorms. 
 Begin with practice versus with theory. To avoid the logical problems of justifi cation, 
we cannot start with theory, moral axioms, fi rst principles, or “types of evidence,” but 
we have to  begin with actual practice in order to avoid the pending infi nite regress; we 
must reconstruct the rules of rational argumentation in actual practice. This takes into 
account the pragmatic turn in philosophy. The suggestions made by Apel, Habermas, 
and the constructivist philosophers demonstrate what such a beginning in practice may 
look like. However, we have to start in a concrete practice, a certain moral community 
or “form of life.” With this selection, we cannot assume the universality of the values 
and the moral rules of that practice right from the beginning (Gethmann  1992 ). 
Any “evidence” of hypernorms that are assumed to prevail within or across par-
ticular practices and institutions does not provide a proper justifi cation for the 
validity of these norms. We cannot assume a position outside the social world, 
a “view from nowhere” as Donaldson and Dunfee (1999a, 14) call it, in order 
to construct checklists for assessing the social world and its norms. Rather, we 
have to start from within, from a “culture of reason” and its aim for peace by 
argumentation (Gethmann  1992 ). 
 Culture of reason . When referring to practice, I suggest beginning with the culture 
of reason (Kambartel  1984 ,  1989b ) that has developed in posttraditional societies 
and that aims at the peaceful resolution of confl icts (Lorenzen  1987a ). Moral 
communities that do not aim for the peaceful resolution of confl icts do not need 
discourse ethics. This does not mean that discourse ethics are unjustifi ed; rather, in this 
case, discourse ethics do not have a pragmatic function. Therefore, the “will of the 
citizen to have peace” (Gethmann  1992 , 151; translation by the author) provides the 
socio–cultural precondition. Without such a will, the public use of reason would not 
have a function in society, and consequently we would not be able to distinguish 
between reason and nonreason. To explain the characteristics of the culture of reason, 
we can include the following from Kambartel (1989b, 42, translation by the author; 
see also Steinmann and Scherer  1998a , 31–32):
  •  In certain situations (in various respects), we draw on generally formulated (and 
addressed) orientations. 
  •  Reasonable consideration does not recognize any privileged positions grammatical-
ly, either on the level of participation or on the level of argumentation. 
  •  We acknowledge the interests of others and include those affected as a perspective 
for our considerations. 
  •  We renounce the limited perspective of our own life and interest situations in 
favor of those of an impartial consideration. 
  •  We orient ourselves in view of a freely shared human community. 
  •  In connection with the foregoing, we also orient ourselves for reciprocal moral 
recognition of the other person. 
  
 These characteristics resemble conditions that are often linked with Habermasian dis-
course ethics, where criteria such as nonprejudice, nonpervasiveness, or noncoercion are 
used to defi ne the ideal speech situation. In the constructivist conception, however, 
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these characteristics have a different foundation. They are used not as criteria 
that are derived from a refl ection on the presuppositions of the possibility of argu-
mentation, but rather as “surfacing illustrations ( Erläuterungen )” (Steinmann and 
Scherer  1998a , 32) of the cultural practice in which we are embedded:
 The conceptual differentiation of practical reason, which we come up against under the 
headings of self-determination, recognition, equality, justice, etc., can only be unfolded 
in its essence from the inside, i.e., only in accompaniment to our practical  entry into 
practice and experience of a particular condition of life. The reasons and judgments 
which are based on this conceptual landscape cannot even be suitably  understood without 
us taking part to a certain extent in the form of life in which these judgments intervene 
for orientation. (Kambartel  1998 , 122, translation by the author) 
 Universalization as a possible but not (always) necessary endeavor . Rational 
argumentation aims at the peaceful solution of particular confl icts among particular 
opponents. Whether there is a need for universalization depends on the specifi cs 
of the situation and whether and how others are affected by the possible solutions 
(Kambartel  1991 ,  1992 ). Constructive philosophy, therefore, does not aim for uni-
versal justifi cations of any moral claim but rather for universalization that goes only 
as far as the specifi c circumstances require (Gethmann  1992 ; Kambartel  1989a ). 
Any consensus concerning values or norms that is reached under ideal or almost 
ideal conditions is assumed to be valid only among those who have taken part in the 
argumentation process. However, it may turn out to be a false consensus. The validity 
of normative claims may be challenged by new evidence or by new actors entering 
the discourse. Therefore, “the unconditional nature of moral validity claims can be 
accounted for in terms of the universality of a normative domain that  is to be brought 
about ” (Habermas  2003b , 261). This implies an inclusive argumentation process 
in which universality is constructed as far as other perspectives are included in the 
discourse (Gethmann  1992 ). Thus, universalization is conceived of as a possible but 
not (always) necessary endeavor. As a result there is no need to universally justify 
substantial hypernorms or to enforce a “fundamental conception of the right and the 
good” (Donaldson and Dunfee  1999a , 52). Rather, intercultural confl ict resolution 
is an ongoing process of inclusion of “the other” into the culture of reason that 
is conceived of as a community with fl exible boundaries (see Gethmann  1992 ). This 
resembles recent ideas on the inclusion of the other proposed by Habermas:
 Equal respect for  everyone is not limited to those who are like us. It extends to the person 
of the other in his or her otherness. And solidarity with the other  as one of us refers to 
the fl exible “we” of a community that resists all substantive determination and extends 
its permeable boundaries even further. (Habermas  2001b , xxxv–xxxvi) 
 Peaceful confl ict resolution and mutual learning. In the process of human develop-
ment, regressions cannot be principally avoided or excluded. What Huntington ( 1996 ) 
described as a “clash of civilizations” almost twenty years ago has become only one 
aspect of a great number of intercultural problems for humankind (e.g., ethnic confl icts, 
displacement of people, growing fundamentalism, inequality) that constitute major 
threats for peace. The culture of reason has the potential to contribute to the resolution 
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of intercultural confl icts, both in business and in politics, but it does not deliver a 
guarantee. It is not up to philosophers to bring the world to reason by brandishing a 
philosophical concept (Rorty  1986 ). Rather, it is up to us, i.e. anybody who is already 
part of the culture of reason, whether we will expand the potential of the culture of 
reason and include others in the underlying practice by sharing the experience of 
peaceful confl ict resolution with the help of free and open discourse (Kambartel  1998 ; 
Habermas  2001a ,  2003a ,  2003b ). Likewise, it is up to us (and anybody who is part of 
the culture of reason) whether we live by the principles of transsubjectivity (Lorenzen 
 1987a ; Wohlrapp  2014 ), are open enough to suspend our prejudices (and eventu-
ally norms that we conceive of as hypernorms today) in order to learn from others 
for the sake of peace, and extend our practices and develop new rules for tomorrow 
(Wohlrapp  1998 ; Habermas  2001a ). By including the Other into our practices and 
letting ourselves be included by Others into their practices, we will be able to learn 
from one another and to jointly and actively shape a peaceful future for humankind. 
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 NOTES 
 1.  Donaldson and Dunfee (1999, 23) defi ne cultural relativism as follows: “No ethical view held by 
one culture is better than any other view held be another culture.“ By contrast, Beauchamp (2010, 237) 
defi nes cultural relativism as a descriptive concept that does not preclude “basic, universal principles that 
cross cultural lines.” The existence of such principles is only excluded in what Beauchamp calls “normative 
relativism.” 
 2.  In addition to these concerns, one reviewer of this article pointed out that the “entire ‘contract’ 
construction seems to play no role at all in the derivation of these hypernorms.” 
 3.  Assertion A can be a truth statement or a normative statement, so that the skeptic’s argument in 
principle applies to both empirical and ethical knowledge. 
 4.  This problem has been discussed in philosophy under various designations, for example, Münchhausen-
Trilemma (Albert  1985 ), Fries Trilemma (Popper  1959 ), and Agrippa’s Trilemma (Klein  2009 ). For a critical 
analysis of this trilemma, see Apel  1987 ; Mittelstrass  1985 . On skepticism and justifi cation, see Audi  2011 ; 
Floridini  1996 . 
 5.  The philosophers related to the three discourse–ethical perspectives worked at the Universities of 
Frankfurt a. M. (Apel, Habermas), Erlangen – Nuremberg (Kamlah, Lorenzen), and Konstanz (Kambartel, 
Mittelstrass). In 1969 at a philosophical congress, Habermas and Lorenzen both held lectures on the discur-
sive justifi cation of norms. They were aware of the similarity in their approaches (cf. Wohlrapp  2014 , xl); 
however, except for occasional references, they did not systematically engage with each other’s work. Instead, 
constructivists emphasize the distinctiveness of constructive philosophy and normally do not use the term 
“discourse–ethics” as a label for their approach. Mittelstrass was a student of Kamlah in Erlangen, and 
went to Konstanz in the early 1970s to join Kambartel. Kambartel went to Frankfurt in 1993, after Apel’s 
retirement. Wohlrapp was a student of Lorenzen in Erlangen and of Kambartel and Mittelstrass in Konstanz 
before he went to Hamburg. Gethmann, though trained and working elsewhere, collaborated closely with 
the constructivists. Even though some of the protagonists had already retired, the constructivist spirit was 
still present during my tenure at the Universities of Erlangen–Nuremberg (1990–2000) and Konstanz (2000–
2002). In particular, it was infl uential in the development of a German business ethics approach that is 
based on discourse–ethical perspectives (Steinmann and Löhr  1989 ,  2015 ). 
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 6.  In order to emphasize the distinctiveness of their approach to the justifi cation of norms, construc-
tivists tend to avoid using “discourse–ethics” as a label for their own philosophical endeavor (Lorenzen 
 1989 , 54). 
 7.  In his subsequent works, Habermas dropped the validity claim to intelligibility and focused on the 
remaining three claims. 
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